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Abstract
Whenever a household faces lack of banking payment services and access to fund-
ing, it often constraints their everyday activities and the chance to avail the financial 
services again. Our study explores the possible explanations of why a household 
becomes financially excluded in an underdeveloped area of Northern Hungary. By 
using a questionnaire (n = 502) in the spring of 2019, we conducted a covariance-
based SEM analysis for detecting the key reasons. We find that the low level of 
income, high ratio of financial problems and high intensity of short-term borrow-
ings equally and directly contribute to the financial exclusion of the households. 
Furthermore, we could not confirm any direct effects of the banking service avail-
ability, although bank services significantly influence an intermediary factor, which 
is the increasing repayment problem in the social environment. Our results verify 
the responsibility of the regulation in lending and debt collection to achieve a better 
social policy.
Keywords Financial exclusion · Access to finance · Northern Hungary · Household 
finance · Structural equation modelling
Résumé
Sans accès aux services bancaires ni au crédit, un ménage voit souvent ses activités 
limitées au quotidien et n’a pas la possibilité de recourir à nouveau à des services fi-
nanciers. Notre étude explore les explications possibles et les raisons qui poussent un 
ménage vers l’exclusion financière dans une zone sous-développée du nord de la Hon-
grie. Pour en détecter les principales raisons, nous avons utilisé un questionnaire (n = 
502) au printemps 2019 et avons réalisé une analyse par la modélisation d’équations 
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structurelles (MES) basée sur la covariance. Nous constatons que le faible niveau de 
revenus, le ratio élevé de problèmes financiers et de nombreux d’emprunts à court 
terme contribuent directement et de façon égale à l’exclusion financière des ménages. 
Par ailleurs, nous n’avons pas pu confirmer les effets directs de la disponibilité des 
services bancaires, bien que les services bancaires aient une influence significative 
sur un facteur intermédiaire : le problème grandissant de remboursement dans cet 
environnement social. Nos résultats viennent confirmer que pour parvenir à une meil-
leure politique sociale, la réglementation en matière de crédit et de recouvrement des 
dettes porte une responsabilité.
Introduction
Financial services are elementary tools of households in achieving their everyday 
life goals. On the one hand, access to finance may enhance the chances of going 
from middle class from poverty. On the other, the literature contests the positive 
role of financial products, namely if money is lent irresponsibly (Cherednychenko 
and Meindertsma 2019), then debt overhang may accelerate social exclusion (Mick-
litz and Domurath 2015) and high-debt burden may cause health problems such as 
cancer (Gilligan et al. 2018). Among the most vulnerable people in the society, debt 
overhang often results in financial exclusion, which is defined as ‘a process whereby 
people encounter difficulties accessing and/or using financial services and products 
in the mainstream markets that are appropriate to their needs and enable them to 
lead a normal social life in the society in which they belong’ (Anderloni et al. 2008, 
p. 4).
Bhalla and Lapeyre (1999) shed light on globalisation leading to social polari-
sation in Hungary and Poland. Their examples demonstrate that a large number 
of people trapped in precarious and often informal forms of work in parallel with 
unemployment become socially excluded and impoverished. This phenomenon still 
exists 20 years later in the low-income part of the society. Household members face 
uncertainty around their employment, social isolation and the disadvantages of spa-
tial distribution in rural areas.
These vulnerable households tend to use both formal and informal credits because 
the formal bank sector often screens them out. Spatial accessibility to banking ser-
vices (Martin-Oliver 2019) and the inefficiency of the financial sectors to provide 
appropriate services (Yah and Mbotta Ntjen 2018) are also real reasons of financial 
exclusion. The symbiosis of the formal and informal loans described by Jain (1999) 
seems to be in effect on the personal loan market as well. Being partially or entirely 
excluded from the banking services builds more barriers returning to the formal job 
market. Moreover, households with overdue debt usually prefer to work informally 
and hide from debt collectors, often outside government regulation (Chen 2014). By 
analysing the determinants of financial product usage in South Africa, Kostov et al. 
(2012) found that removing supply-side constraints of financial services alone itself 
does not necessarily expand access to finance and improve the chance for growth.
Although our study focuses on the access of finance (being excluded uninten-
tionally), we note that the willingness to use may also imply financial exclusion, 
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which heavily depends on the social trust among households (Xu 2020). Aversion 
of uncertainty, religion, gender and culture are considered as the most determi-
native reasons for trust in financial institutions. Ahunov and Van Hove (2020) 
show that uncertainty avoidance has a significant negative effect on trust in 
banks. Many macro-level studies (such as Glaeser et al. 2000; Guiso et al. 2003; 
Kim et al. 2018) highlight the importance of religion, while others (e.g. Adegbite 
and Machethe 2020 or Zins and Weill 2016) expose the role of gender gap in 
the access to financial services. Our study contributes to the literature by show-
ing that in case of poor consumer’s protection, low-income indebted households 
may be permanently excluded. Thus, we look for the demand- and supply-side 
constraint determinants of using financial services on the margin of the society as 
well.
The general question we investigate is how and to what extent the process toward 
financial exclusion is influenced by (1) the income-generating capacity of house-
holds, (2) the social environment, (3) the loan usage (credit history) of households 
and (4) the physical availability of banking services in a particular rural area in 
Northern Hungary, which belongs to the poorest 5% of the nomenclature of territo-
rial units for statistics level 2 (NUTS-2) regions in the European Union (EU). The 
chosen region, the rural segment of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County, represents a 
large number of households in a bad financial situation, allowing us to concentrate 
on one culturally and socially unified area. The ratio of deprived Roma people is 
particularly high in the observed area, who are heavily threatened by financial exclu-
sion, which is related to former bad credit history, which may further transform into 
a debt spiral or trap. We investigate the economic (non-psychological) factors of this 
transformation. Our findings not only identify the problem of regions falling behind 
but also enhance the dispute on reducing financial exclusion of disadvantaged social 
and ethnic groups through the digitalisation of the economy.
To better understand factors leading to financial exclusion, we carried out a sur-
vey (n = 502) in the region and built a conceptual framework explaining financial 
exclusion pathways. We employed covariance-based structural equation modelling 
to test our hypotheses which reveals a direct relationship between the measured and 
latent variables, helping us create an interpretative framework to explain micro-level 
observations at the mezzo/macro-level.
We find that the lower the level of income, the higher the ratio of financial 
problems in the social environment and that high-intensity short-term borrowings 
equally and directly contribute to the financial exclusion of households. We can-
not confirm any direct effects of the banking service supply on the exclusion; how-
ever, bank services significantly influence an intermediary factor—the increasing 
repayment problems in the social environment. In contrast to our aims related to 
the housing loan collapse in Hungary after the 2008 crisis, former loan-term loan 
usage did not significantly increase financial exclusion chances. Further, the direct 
effect of repayment issues in the social environment to financial exclusion suggests 
that banks apply credit rationing for those who have similar characters and credit 
application scores to the formerly bankrupted peers. The results also highlight the 
indisputable role of short-term loan products, which intermediate the effects of the 
low level of income; such loans are more harmful than useful for poor households. 
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Considering the social policy implications, our results suggest that banking regula-
tion cannot mitigate the danger of becoming financially excluded without effective 
income policy and debt settlement actions.
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. An overview of the preliminary 
results of the explanations for financial exclusion is discussed next, followed by an 
introduction of the sample and the applied method. In the empirical analysis section, 
we explore the results of the structural equation modelling. Further investigation is 
presented then along with policy implications, followed by the conclusion.
Literature and Context
In this study, financial exclusion primarily refers to the lack of access to formal bank 
loans and forced abstention of bank debit. We do not consider other non-elementary 
financial products pertaining to insurance or investments. We take the substitution 
effect of informal financial possibilities into account. Notably, informal lending 
exists because of the lower information asymmetry between the lender and the bor-
rower. However, it often leads to unethical consequences.
Financial exclusion also reflects a phenomenon embedded in a network of com-
plex and multi-level social exclusion of low-income population, which includes 
the households’ deprivation of social and financial opportunities, as Leyshon and 
Thrift (1996) describes. It also signifies that a group in the society is prevented from 
acquiring any financial system services which often goes hand in hand with social 
exclusion (Anderloni and Carluccio 2006; Anderloni et al. 2008, p. 10).
There are several explanations as to why households take bank loans beyond their 
capacities. A major part of the literature explains debt overhang with the lack of 
financial literacy or financial imprudence, such as in studies by Hilgert et al. (2003); 
Disney et  al. (2008); and Lusardi and Tufano (2009). Many a times, households 
underestimate the probability of future adverse events (Kilborn 2005) and enter 
carelessly into a debt contract. However, Campbell (2006) states that only the poorer 
and the less educated minorities in US households make significant mistakes. The 
second group of theories is related to over-consumption and particularly its psycho-
logical causes. Research reveals the main psychological attributes of borrowing con-
sumer debt (Lea et al. 1995) and credit-card debt (Norvilitis et al. 2006). The litera-
ture on the causal chain of over-consumption also includes a study by Garðarsdóttir 
and Dittmar (2012), who conclude that ‘[bad] money management skills and greater 
tendency towards compulsive buying and spending’ (471) induce debt overhangs 
and the pressure of the consumer society does not influence only the disadvantaged 
families. The third group of arguments is about loans to cover unexpected expenses 
of households and the lack of emergency savings (Keese 2009). The main types of 
liquidity shocks are negative events such as illnesses, loss of job, medical expenses 
or changes in the family structure. At that time, households do not judge their future 
financial conditions.
Even if households evict a loan that seems to be in their capacity, there is 
a huge possibility that they will still go bankrupt. Fay et  al. (2002) found that 
bankruptcy filing could be advantageous for the US households; however, there 
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is little evidence on the households choosing bankruptcy in a conscious, stra-
tegical way. Refusing redemption can be either a rational or an irrational deci-
sion. When an unexpected liquidity shock arises in a period of redemption, it 
is rational, without any reservation to declare bankruptcy (Big Lottery Fund 
2018). In many cases, non-payment may work as a social or healthcare insurance 
(Dobbie and Song 2015; Mahoney 2015). Behavioural factors also play a role in 
household defaults, such as persons with low self-efficacy (the perception of the 
benefits from acting) go bankrupt more often (Kuhnen and Melzer 2018), and 
personality attributes also influence repayment behaviours (Parise and Peijnen-
burg 2019).
After bankruptcy, the debt collector could claim a lump-sum redemption, 
restructure the payments (‘repayment plan’) or start the recovery procedure 
wherein the household’s private assets can be seized. The regulation environ-
ment for the remission of debt differs across countries; the major concepts of 
private bankruptcy regulations originate from the Anglo-Saxon, the Continen-
tal (European) and the Scandinavian legal frameworks. However, little is known 
about those who became financially excluded after bankruptcy. Further, the 
defaulted households may face financial distress in a trapped situation, getting 
out of which is difficult and can lead to a state of learned helplessness and apa-
thy. There are a few lessons about such negative spill-over effects. In a socio-
logical study of a Hungarian village, Gosztonyi (2017) found interpersonal and 
informal lending where families faced serious debt payment disorders. Informal 
networks function as an insurance risk community against individual liquidity 
shocks. However, these networks hold back individual savings as such reserves 
are transferred to the just-in-need community members.
There are job market and macro-financial drawbacks of these financial dis-
tresses. Using US household data, Bernstein (2015) reports that negative home 
equity (mortgage) causes a 2–6% reduction in household labour supply. Consid-
ering the post-socialist countries in Europe, low-income households responded 
to the shortages of the formal labour market and their exclusion from formal 
banking institutions by special survival strategies (Fleck and Virág 2000; Kovai 
2017; Danyi and Vigvári 2019). Macro-effects of household debts and the non-
performed loans have been often investigated, such as by Rinaldi and Sanchis-
Arellano (2006) and Lombardi et  al. (2017). Unfortunately, Beck and Brown 
(2011) found that state bank ownership does not induce financial inclusion for 
rural or poor urban households.
There are only a few studies in the literature describing the financial exclu-
sion pathways. A notable one by D’Alessio and Iezzi (2013) carried out a frame-
work to measure over-indebtedness and applied it on Italian observations. Many 
related applications of the structural equation modelling reveal determinants of 
social exclusion without having to investigate financial dimensions. For exam-
ple, Hajdu (2009) studied a Hungarian sample, while Ruesga-Benito et  al. 
(2018) examined socially excluded young adults in the EU. However, to our best 
knowledge, there is no empirical data revealing a direct or indirect relationship 
between formal financial exclusion and their determining factors. We aim to 
close this gap by examining the roles of these factors.
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Data and Conceptual Framework
Overview of the Sample
Our observed region, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County, has a fragmented village 
structure, with many socioeconomically disadvantaged inhabitants, compared to 
other Hungarian areas. Figure 1 illustrates the geographical location of the survey, 
roughly representing European districts where households facing problems with 
unexpected expenses are relatively high in number (on the left). An empirical report 
by Fondeville et al. (2010) emphasises that indebtedness and defaults of households 
are major problems in Eastern Europe. The figure also shows the 57 municipalities 
included in the sample (on the right); they are marked green. The dots on the map 
indicate the placements of bank (red) or saving cooperative (green) branches.
The survey is restricted to the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County households and 
families residing in a small rural settlement, relatively far from bank branches. Fol-
lowing Banerjee and Duflo’s (2007) argument on debt that decisions in rural house-
holds are not usually made on an individual but a household level, the analysed unit 
used is that of the household. Since low-income rural residents are less likely to 
answer online or telephonic questionnaires, we carried out face-to-face interviewers 
to get reliable data in the local debt trap context.
The sample was selected in two stages. In the first stage, we determined the target 
population that consists of 342 settlements (107,153 households; 282,504 inhabit-
ants). Then, we chose the sample from 57 settlements based on a probability sam-
pling at 95% confidence level and ± 11.87% margin of error. In the second stage, 
we calculated quotas for the population of the households of n = 31,122 (86,146 
residents); following this, interviews were carried out by random walk sampling 
in each of the settlements (5–15 randomly selected households). The municipality 
mayors were notified two weeks in advance for the interviews. The interviewees 
Fig. 1  Geographical identification. Left: European countries with high proportion of households fac-
ing problems with unexpected financial expenses (Source Eurostat (2019), Civic Consulting based on 
Eurostat, SILC data). Right: Map of Hungary and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County with the investigated 
micro-regions (Source Authors; the survey was conducted in the green zones; red dots: bank branches; 
green dots: post offices. Made by ArcGIS 10.4)
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were adults (18 + years). Data was collected from 504 households between March 
and April 2019, and after excluding the extremes, we kept 502 observations. At 95% 
confidence level, n = 502 sample size, the margin of error was ± 4.34% (considering 
107,153 households at 95% confidence level, n = 502 sample size results in a 4.36% 
confidence interval).
Table 1 summarises the descriptive statistics on households as the observational 
units. There is a perceptible over-representation of the female respondents (71%), 
who answered questions related to the households. Usually, females received the 
interviewer as they were housewives; moreover, in Hungarian and Roma house-
holds, they are responsible for financial and familial issues. The observed data veri-
fies that male respondents more likely belonged to single households and female 
respondents represented families of 2 to 6. As our aim was to evaluate mechanisms 
on the household level, we decided to use this household-focused sample to inves-
tigate the gender bias and gender effects for further analysis. We also found (not 
denoted in the table) that 41% of the respondents belong to Roma ethnicity which is 
higher than the average (8.5%) of the county. The difference can be explained by the 
higher Roma population ratio in smaller settlements. The ethnicity was assessed by 
Table 1  Region overview: descriptive statistics from the survey sample (n = 502)
a Loan from others in the answers often mean usury
Statistics Value Statistics Value
Respondents Loan history of the households
 Female (%) 71.31  Covered loan (%) (e.g. mortgage, auto 
loans)
13.5
 Age (average) 44.44  Uncovered loan (%) (e.g. personal loans) 27.1
 No bank account (%) 40.52  Arrears in covered loan repayment (%) 5.8
 College/university degree (%) 4.98  Arrears in uncovered loan repayment (%) 12.2
 Secondary school (%) 19.72  Under recovery procedure (%) 15.1
 Vocational education (%) 29.88  Loan from family (%) 39.4
 Elementary school (%) 38.05  Loan from  othersa (%) 12.9
 Elementary: not finished (%) 7.37  Usury (%) 2.6
Household income and labour market 
situation
Financial service availability in the settle-
ment
 Household net income, EUR (monthly, 
mean)
729.8  No bank branch (%) 100.0
 Household net income, EUR (monthly, 
st. dev.)
460.9  No ATMs (%) 71.5
 Household members (average) 3.57  No savings cooperatives (%) 75.1
 Full-time employed (%) 28.9  No post office (%) 16.9




 Maternity leave (%) 3.7
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the interviewer. 40.52% of the respondents did not have bank accounts (altogether, 
29% of the households reported absence of bank accounts). The level of education 
shows a high variety among the respondents. The average monthly net income of the 
households was around EUR 730, which is around EUR 386 per capita, according to 
the OECD equivalence scale (household income by the square root of the household 
size). In comparison, in the first half of 2019, the average monthly net income was 
EUR 566 in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County and EUR 724 in Hungary. The table 
provides insights on household loan history and accessibility to financial services.
Conceptual Framework
In this section, we introduce our conceptual framework and explain the assumed 
relationships among the key factors. Our main objective is to reveal the determinants 
of formal financial exclusion. We capture formal financial exclusion with actions 
that are taken because households are constrained to using formal financial services, 
such as bank accounts and bank loans. Hence, our research focuses on the access 
rather than the (willingness of) use of financial services. We investigate four major 
alternating explanations which can be considered the determining factors.
The first is the low-income-generating capacity, which mostly goes together 
with social exclusion. In the case of low-income households, loans or debit prod-
ucts cannot be used in the regular way because the borrowers cannot pay back the 
amount; thus, lower income may subserve exclusion. Income-generating capacity 
may influence the short-term and long-term loan usage as well. It may also posi-
tively correlate with current financial difficulties arising in the social environment of 
households.
The second factor is the lack of availability of banking services, which means 
high transaction costs for banking. Spatial segregation, technical barriers or high-
debt collecting costs (thus, high interest rates on personal loans) may make it more 
difficult to access financial services. This availability may strengthen access to 
finances and may decrease the chances of financial exclusion. Income may correlate 
with the presence of financial services; banks may offer less services to the poorer 
areas.
The third is the drawbacks of information asymmetry. We identify this phenom-
enon under the negative consequences of default in the social network, which indi-
cates that the social environment of a household experiences more negative con-
sequences with loan repayment problems. Appearing financial difficulties in the 
social network decreases the chance of access to finance, hence lenders cannot dis-
tinguish between the reliable and problematic households during loan application. 
Because of the higher information asymmetry, solvent households will more likely 
be rejected by banks.
The fourth one is the bad credit history of households. Former defaults or pre-
sent unpaid debentures predict poor repayment and saving behaviour. Moreover, too 
much debt could be an impeding factor in access to formal finance, even if the debtor 
meets their obligations. This situation may also bring in serious redemption problems 
if an income shock arises. Repayment difficulties may lead to bankruptcy, recovery 
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procedure and financial exclusion. Instead of explicitly investigating the underlying bad 
credit histories (for example, poor financial literacy, consumption commitment issues, 
unexpected changes in the family or employment status, health problems or unexpected 
income shocks), we are concentrating on the key determinants and consequences. To 
learn more about the transmitting mechanisms, we consider the roles of short-term and 
long-term loans in a different way. Short-term borrowing could mean that households 
face daily living problems. Short-term loan usage can be influenced by income-gener-
ating capacity, defaults in the social network or bank service availability. Long-term 
loans could cover durable goods or a home, which can be linked to a higher income. 
However, bankrupted mortgages may induce serious debt traps. Long-term loans can 
be influenced by income, social environment and banking service availability and may 
also correlate with short-term loan usage.
The conceptual framework suggests setting up three major hypotheses and some 
sub-hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 Depth of formal financial exclusion is determined by
(A) household income,
(B) bank service availability,
(C) prevalence of defaults in the social network,
(C) short-term (D.S.)/long-term (D.L.) loan credit history.
Hypothesis 2 Level of short-term (H2.S.)/long-term (H2.L.) credit usage is deter-
mined by
(A) household income,
(B) bank service availability,
(C) prevalence of defaults in the social network.
Hypothesis 3 Prevalence of defaults in the social network is influenced by
(A) the income of the surveyed households,
(B) the bank service availability of the surveyed households.
Altogether, we have 5 + 2*3 + 2 = 13 sub-hypotheses.
Figure 2 shows the structure of our conceptual framework which consists of the six 
main components. We are also curious about the covariances between long- and short-
term loan usage and income and bank service availability. These relations are indicated 
in Fig. 2.
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Empirical Results
Estimation Methodology
For testing our hypotheses, we employed covariance-based structural equation mod-
elling (CB-SEM) with the method described by Muthén and Muthén (2004). Our 
estimation was carried out by R software (version 3.6.3) and the lavaan package 
(version 0.6-5).
The approach defines the equations of the following:
 where y and η are vectors of endogenous and exogenous latent variables, x is a 
vector of observed variables, ν is a vector of measurement intercepts, α is vector 
of latent intercepts, Λ is a matrix of factor loadings and K, B and Γ are matrices of 
regression coefficients.
We used the maximum likelihood estimator with Huber/Pseudo ML/sandwich 
corrections (called MLR in Mplus) to determine the equation coefficients. Though 
our data variables typically do not come from normal distribution and the multivari-
ate normality was not satisfied (employing Mardia’s test for multivariate normality 
and Shapiro–Wilk test for univariate normality), the parameter estimates can still be 
consistent when the model is identified and correctly specified. In such cases, stand-
ard errors may tend to be too small, increasing the chance to reject the null hypoth-
esis without a reason. Moreover, the model chi-squared test statistic may become 
yi =  + Λi + Kxi + i
i =  + Bi + Γxi + i
Fig. 2  The conceptual framework explaining formal financial exclusion
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too large; thus, we may reject the model too often (Rosseel 2012). MLR computes 
standard errors using a sandwich estimator and applied chi-square test statistic 
which is asymptotically equivalent to Yuan-Bentler T2-star test statistics. Thus, the 
standard errors and chi-square test statistics were robust to non-normality.
We ran several iterations to reach our final model during the selection of vari-
ables suggested by our conceptual framework. Based on MacCallum et al.’s (1992) 
method, we first tested our pre-made (a priori) conceptual model on the variable set 
and then continuously made alternative models and compared them to the previous 
ones. Only the last version is discussed in this study. For reproducibility, we publish 
the covariance matrix of the data in Table 5 in Appendix.
For absolute model fit criteria, we used chi squared (Bollen 1989) and Compara-
tive Fit Index (CFI) (Bentler 1989). These criteria, described by Hoyle and Panter 
(1995, pp. 165–169), related to the degree to which the covariances implied by 
the fix and free parameters specified in the model match the observed covariances, 
from which free parameters in the model are estimated (Johnson 1998, p. 146). We 
also used the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) and the p value 
as recommended by Browne and Cudeck (1993) to determine our model fit. Our 
model provided a good fit: chi squared = 544.887, degrees of freedom = 294, p 
value = 0.000 (Yuan-Bentler T2 test statistic), CFI = 0.906, RMSEA = 0.41 and the 
PCLOSE value = 0.9997.
Measurement Model
To construct the latent variables, we applied a reflective measurement approach 
wherein measures represent the manifestations of the latent factors.
We connected formal financial exclusion with variables such as (1) a bank 
account at the household, (2) abstinence from using a bank account because any sav-
ings would be withdrawn by debt collectors or in household borrowings, (3) usury 
or (4) family loan because of rejected credit applications. We interpret usury and 
family borrowings as possible reactions to replace non-available formal loans.
Household income or income-generating capacity involves the measures of (1) 
disposable income, (2) existence of savings, (3) education as a proxy for work-
ing efficiency and ability, (4) public worker and (5) unemployment. Bank service 
availability is measured by (1) spatial distance of brick and mortar bank branches, 
the presence of (2) postal branches, (3) bank ATMs and (4) size of the settlement 
(village).
We describe the negative consequences of default in the social network as the sur-
vey responses about the social environment reflecting (1) constrained bank account 
usage; informal borrowing from (2) private persons and (3) family members; (4) 
pawn shop usage; property losses such as loss of (5) real or (6) personal estate; or 
(7) forced move to other residence. For the ‘Do you know somebody’ questions, 
the respondents denoted themselves as well; this time, the answers were counted as 
‘there is someone’. By repeating the estimations excluding the ‘myself’ answers, we 
did not find significant changes and evidence of inherent technical correlation.
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We identified short-term loans as personal loans (1) during repayment or (2) 
past due and (3) the fact of borrowing from a bank because of financial difficulties 
in the last one year. During the preparatory stage of this research, we did not find 
strong correlation with commercial credits other smaller bank loans. Therefore, we 
excluded them from the analysis. We describe long-term loan usage with (1) hous-
ing loans, (2) mortgage and (3) former existence of foreign exchange denominated 
home loans. According to our preparatory analysis, auto loans did not show signifi-
cant explanatory power.
Table 2. details the observable variables form the survey and how they capture 
the latent variables of the conceptual framework which are verified by confirma-
tory factor analysis (CFA) and each of our latent variables being significant at the 
0.05 level and all but two at 0.01 level. The estimated coefficients are several cases 
under 0.7; however, we kept these variables from theoretical considerations. Instead 
of creating the most well-fitted measurement model, we aimed to construct latent 
variables that are connected to some theoretically supported variables, despite their 
lower statistical explanatory power. To improve the model, after checking modifica-
tion indices of the observed variables, we extended the base specification by add-
ing some residual correlations. The selected correlated variable pairs are detailed in 
Table 6 in Appendix.
The internal consistency reliability was tested using Chronbach’s alpha 
(alpha = 0.5881), which was over 0.5 and acceptable, even if it is not strong. The 
composite reliability was above 0.7 (CR = 0.8904), hence we decided to accept the 
model (for using it for structural modelling), even though the validity of some meas-
urement variables show low commonality (average variance extracted is below 0.5, 
in the case of defaults in social network and banking service availability variables). 
Divergent validity criteria (where square-root AVE > largest correlation with other 
factors) satisfy almost all factors, except financial exclusion and short-term loan.
Structural Model
Our structural model is designed according to the formalised hypothesis. The results 
confirm only five effects but clearly provide a sharper picture resolution of the major 
causes. Figure 3 illustrates the structures in our overall model.
We find that financial exclusion is directly determined by three major factors: 
the household income, the defaults in the social networks and the short-term loan 
usage (however, the last has 10% significance level only). These confirm that low 
incomes of the households accelerate formal financial exclusion (H1.A), short-term 
loans bring households to the brink of formal financial exclusion (H1.D.S) and more 
defaults in the social environment increase the vulnerability to financial exclusion 
(H1.C). The last relationship may be because of the credit rationing of the banks, 
which happens to be our main intuition. We do not expose the variety of the intrinsic 
mechanisms that promote credit rationing, which can be set off by similarity among 
the members of a social network. These usually cannot be observed at credit appli-
cation, for example, financial literacy, capability of the consumption commitment, 
hidden interpersonal financial claims (within the family or in context of local loan 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Highways to Hell? Paths Towards the Formal Financial Exclusion:…
sharks) or other social situations and norms that may characterise the entire social 
group. We find that the H1.B hypothesis (direct effect of bank service availability) is 
not statistically significant. The average distance from a bank branch is 15 km with 
a range of 3–39 km; however, 16.9% of the respondents live in a settlement with no 
post office. The post offices offer some reduced services for initiating bank transac-
tions, saving or even applying for a personal loan. Other substitutes, such as visiting 
agents of payday loan providers and mobile banking, are still available in the area.
We find two drivers of the endogenous factors. First, defaults in the social net-
work are sensitive to the availability of the banking service (H3.B): the appearance 
of the defaults in the social environment is more frequent in areas with easier access 
to banking services. Supposing that households experiencing defaults in their envi-
ronment possess worse financial literacy, we can explain why poor access to banking 
service is caused indirectly but not directly by financial exclusion. Second, the usage 
of short-term loans is more intense where household income is lower (H.2.S.A): 
poorer households rather need short-term borrowings from financial institutions.
By analysing the long-term loan usage, we identify banking services to be at 
the 10% significance level, but no other factors explain the long-term borrowings; 
furthermore, long-term loans do not seem to push households toward financial 
exclusion.
Table 3 summarises our hypothesis test findings. We conclude that low income 
may induce more intense short-term borrowings, and if the household cannot avail 
any loans, it may lead to financial exclusion. Moreover, short-term credit products 
may endanger households in themselves. This narrative is amplified by the fact that 
bank service supply facilitates financial exclusion in the social environment where 
bad credit history appears more prominent.
According to Table  4, two significant indirect relationships (income_stloan 
and bankservice_socnetdefault) are in effect in the estimated model. At first, the 
Fig. 3  Overall model
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short-term loan usage mediates the effect of income towards financial exclusion: 
income negatively influences the short-term loan, also a determinant of financial 
exclusion. Second, the default occurrences in the social network intermediate the 
effect of bank service availability (with 5% significance): banking service availa-
bility is positively correlated with socnet_default, which fosters financial exclusion. 
Total effect coefficients of income and banking service availability seem to be statis-
tically significant (the latter with 10% significance), which also bolster the hypoth-
esis that lower income and stronger banking service availability altogether induce 
rather than prevent exclusion.
Further Analysis
Importantly, households in Hungary trust less in banks after the financial and FX-
mortgage crisis (overview by Csizmady and Hegedüs 2016). Since the wage is to 
be paid to the bank accounts, households are willing to use bank products if they 
have an employed status. Although our survey does not address direct questions for 
revealing trust, it offers some insights into the avoidance of the use of bank accounts. 
Altogether, 60% of those respondents who own no bank account answered that they 
do not need any. Generally, they are in a hopeless labour market situation, and there 
is no income to receive in a bank account. Moreover, 20% of the respondents do 
not use bank accounts because they are withdrawn by debt collectors (there is 7.3% 
overlap with the no-need answers).
Table 4  Mediation effects in 
the model
Est std estimated standardised coefficient, SE robust standard error 
(Huber-White)
p < 0.001:***, 0.001 < p < 0.01:**, 0.01 < p < 0.05:*, 
p < 0.05 < p < 0.10
Indirect and total effects Est std SE p value
income_stloan − 0.217 0.072 0.0020**
income_ltloan 0.004 0.007 0.5300
income_socnetdefault − 0.010 0.021 0.6180
income_socnetdefault_stloan − 0.001 0.002 0.7580
income_socnetdefault_ltloan − 0.0001 0.0002 0.7810
total_income − 0.709 0.082 0***
bankservice_stloan 0.065 0.057 0.2550
bankservice_ltloan 0.007 0.011 0.4910
bankservice_socnetdefault 0.107 0.034 0.0020**
bankservice_socnetdefault_stloan 0.006 0.015 0.7050
bankservice_socnetdefault_ltloan 0.001 0.002 0.7350
total_bankservice 0.210 0.091 0.0210*
socnetdefault_stloan 0.017 0.044 0.7080
socnetdefault_ltloan 0.002 0.005 0.7340
total_socnetdefault 0.329 0.085 0.0001***
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To detect the indirect effects of religion, we added the settlement-based reli-
gion data from the census of 2011 provided by the Hungarian Statistical Office 
to us and reported the estimated relationships in Table 7 of the Appendix. On 
considering the three major religions in the area (Roman Catholics, Greek Cath-
olics, and Calvinists), we find evidence that the ratio of the Roman Catholics is 
negatively correlated with financial exclusion. Furthermore, gender and ethnic-
ity may modify the bank usage behaviour patterns; the effects are summarised in 
Table 8 in the Appendix. The respondent’s gender itself has no significant effect, 
but the short-term loan intensifies, while long-term loan and income weaken 
the original effects on females. Ethnicity significantly influences the financial 
exclusion score. Because of this, to reveal the validity of the main hypotheses 
for Roma (n = 211) and non-Roma (n = 291) households, we analyse the re-esti-
mated model for the two sub-samples. The results of the structural models are 
summarised in Table 9 in the Appendix, with a note that these models are less 
reliable. By evaluating the analysis on Roma and non-Roma sub-samples, we 
learn that the model for the non-Roma population is not valid anymore. In case 
of the Roma, the short-term loan and defaults in the social environment fac-
tors are still in effect, suggesting that banks lend to a more vulnerable group of 
people.
Because financial exclusion never appears alone, we consider the spill-over 
effects for the labour supply behaviour, the health conditions, the future outlook 
and the actual living conditions of the households. By gathering answers for 
these attributes from the survey, we can analyse the common occurrences. We 
use the predicted financial exclusion factor scores and calculate averages within 
each category group of the six selected variables. In Table 10, group means are 
sorted out in decreasing order; the categories at the top of the sections are the 
closest to financial exclusion. Unregistered and inactive job market statuses 
have the highest factor scores, which is in accordance with anecdotes of ‘hid-
ing’ bankrupt individuals whose wage would be charged by the debt collectors if 
they were registered in their workplace. Health satisfaction—which may divert 
to the real health situation—shows lower, but existent, dispersion due to being 
excluded.
Our results imply that the banking services designed for the middle-class 
and the punitive debt collection rules negatively impact the households that live 
in poverty, where there is a low chance of developing a successful small busi-
ness or even landing a permanent job. The irresponsible lending of loan prod-
ucts intensifies consumption instead of enhancing entrepreneurial activities. As 
a result, an ambiguous situation arises, i.e. financial institutions do not provide 
economic opportunities for those living in poverty but entangle them in a debt 
trap and force them out of access to formal financial institutions for life, leaving 
them to cope with the nightmare of an irrecoverable loan contract. In response 
to this phenomenon, there is empirical evidence (Gosztonyi 2017; Danyi and 
Vígvári 2019) on the evolution of informal and archaic shadow financial institu-
tions for low-income communities, which means effective barriers to individual 
savings.
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Conclusion
Based on widely accessible international literature, financial exclusion in the 
form of lacking access to funding can be ascertained to hinder an entrepreneur 
in India or African countries, dwindle individual savings or make managing pay-
ments more difficult. Sometimes, it is connected to language barriers, financial 
literacy, migration (cultural or religion differences) or spatial distance from phys-
ical facilities. This study aims to put another explanatory factor on a map: the 
short-term borrowings of impoverished households to cover their temporal short-
ages. According to the H1 set of hypotheses, we document the demand- and sup-
ply-side constraints of access to finance in case of impoverished households. In 
case of low income, the social environment (credit rationing) and the short-term 
borrowings from the formal banking sector, we find direct effects; furthermore, 
banking supply exerts its negative effects only through the social environment. 
According to the H2 set, short-term loans may become toxic for households wish-
ing to maintain the former (not so high) living standards independently of their 
financial knowledge or literacy. We also highlight that repayment problems not 
only influence the loan victims but also amplify financial exclusion of their social 
environment as well (H3). The phenomenon is stronger, but not exclusively, in 
the Roma minority, which suffered from notable impoverishment in the last three 
decades. In our observed region, formal financial exclusion often goes hand in 
hand with falling off from the job market, suffering from mental depression and 
facing exclusion from the public utilities as well.
We, therefore, believe that it would be worthwhile to rethink and reinterpret 
the credit structures in semi-peripheral and peripheral countries and reconsider 
the recovery and debt collecting regulations. It would also be important to incor-
porate social network factors which play an important role in indebtedness into 
the credit rating processes. The challenge is to offer people living in poverty the 
opportunity to extricate themselves out of unofficial credit networks and, thus, 
develop a formal system of financial institutions that is better adapted to low-
income families.
Appendix
See Table 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.
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Table 9  Structural model for Roma and non-Roma sub-samples
Measurement model tests are as follows: RMSEA = 0.053, CFI = 0.854, chi square = 471.256, df = 294, 
p value = 0 (Roma subsample), RMSEA = 0.041, CFI = 0.891, chi square = 438.524, df = 294, p value = 0 
(non-Roma subsample)
Est std estimated standardised coefficient, SE robust standard error (Huber-White)
p < 0.001:***, 0.001 <  p  < 0.01:**, 0.01 <  p  < 0.05:*, p  < 0.05 <  p  < 0.10
Left-hand side Right-hand side Roma subsample (N = 211) Non-Roma subsample 
(N = 291)
Est std SE p value Est std SE p value
finexcl ~ stloan .674 .240 .005** .692 .405 .087
finexcl ~ ltloan .149 .158 .348 − .046 .190 .807
finexcl ~ socnetdefault .626 .208 .003** .011 .222 .959
finexcl ~ income − .223 .293 .446 − .493 .298 .098
finexcl ~ bankservice − .073 .207 .723 .040 .154 .797
stloan ~ income − .301 .125 .016* − .479 .097 0***
stloan ~ bankservice .137 .176 .436 .233 .201 .246
stloan ~ socnetdefault − .045 .178 .800 .084 .124 .500
ltloan ~ income .418 .261 .109 − .014 .098 .885
ltloan ~ bankservice .166 .119 .165 .020 .090 .823
ltloan ~ socnetdefault 0 .149 .998 .066 .090 .464
socnetdefault ~ income − .015 .255 .952 .113 .098 .251
socnetdefault ~ bankservice .447 .080 0*** .234 .102 .022*
Highways to Hell? Paths Towards the Formal Financial Exclusion:…
Table 10  Revealing some spillovers of financial exclusion: group means of financial exclusion scores
Number of observations (n), mean, standard errors (SE) and p values (p value) two-sided t test (null 
is the mean equals to zero) are detailed by category groups. The higher the formal financial exclusion 
value, the closer the household is to financial exclusion
p < 0.001:***, 0.001 < p < 0.01:**, 0.01 < p < 0.05:*, p < 0.05 < p < 0.10
Variable Category n Mean SE p value
Job market status Unregistered job status 11 0.2547 0.0543 0.0009***
Inactive 16 0.1526 0.0461 0.0048**
Public worker 130 0.0630 0.0149 0.0000***
Unemployed 47 0.0430 0.0236 0.0755
On maternity 48 0.0307 0.0275 0.2696
Other 16 − 0.0014 0.0385 0.9713
Pensioner 47 − 0.0285 0.0202 0.1644
Part-time job 12 − 0.0344 0.0432 0.4429
Full-time job 167 − 0.0852 0.0082 0.0000***
Working abroad 1 − 0.1275 NA NA
Pupil 6 − 0.1349 0.0630 0.0853
Health satisfaction Very unsatisfied 31 0.0406 0.0313 0.2053
So-so 114 0.0362 0.0156 0.0218*
Rather unsatisfied 86 0.0328 0.0199 0.1026
Rather satisfied 183 − 0.0176 0.0122 0.1503
Very satisfied 88 − 0.0566 0.0141 0.0001***
Future outlooks Very unsatisfied 31 0.1193 0.0343 0.0016**
Rather unsatisfied 107 0.0462 0.0151 0.0028**
So-so 203 0.0040 0.0119 0.7373
Very satisfied 40 − 0.0275 0.0255 0.2870
Rather satisfied 112 − 0.0690 0.0132 0.0000***
Does not know 9 − 0.0693 0.0439 0.1533
Being up and coming Never 72 0.0904 0.0215 0.0001***
One or two days in a week 147 0.0610 0.0138 0.0000***
No answer 1 0.0377 NA NA
More than half of the days 139 − 0.0364 0.0134 0.0076**
Does not know 7 − 0.0654 0.0380 0.1356
Almost everyday 136 − 0.0735 0.0104 0.0000***
Water supply Yes, formerly, but now it is 
available
37 0.1645 0.0329 0.0000***
Yes, and presently is turned off 12 0.1369 0.0511 0.0215*
No answer 83 0.1278 0.0199 0.0000***
Never 370 − 0.0496 0.0067 0.0000***
Electricity supply Yes, formerly, but now it is 
available
103 0.1656 0.0182 0.0000***
Yes, and presently is turned off 11 0.1310 0.0464 0.0181*
Never 388 − 0.0477 0.0066 0.0000***
Formal financial exclusion score 502 0.0000 0.1675
 M. Gosztonyi, D. Havran 
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